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ABSTRACT
The essay discusses congruency issues in the biosemiotic approach of 
the Danish biochemist, Jesper Hoffmeyer. The authors understand 
Hoffmeyer’s anti-reductionistic approach to be similar to Michael 
Polanyi’s multi-layered ontology, but suggest that the Polanyian approach 
has fewer handicaps as a model-building enterprise. We offer a historical 
review of Hoffmeyer’s polarized narrative of 20th century biology and 
investigate his central thesis that life and semiosis are coextensive. We 
argue that Hoffmeyer conflates temporal and spatial features of semi-
otic systems, his account of emergentism is unclear and the relationship 
between semiotic evolution and punctuated equilibrium is vague, possi-
bly entailing incongruent metaphysical views.
Introduction: Two Biosemiotics Approaches
In this essay, we point to some congruency issues in the biosemiotic approach to 
life, as is exemplified in the work of the Danish biochemist, Jesper Hoffmeyer. Our 
starting point is his evaluation of the understanding of life and meaning inspired by 
the biologist Jakob von Uexküll plus the semiotic approaches of Charles S. Peirce and 
Thomas Sebeok (Gulick 2012, 23). We understand Hoffmeyer’s approach to be similar 
to Michael Polanyi’s, as recently discussed in Gulick (2012). Both are anti-reductionist 
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enterprises (Goldstein 2012, Hoffmeyer 2008), but our comparison suggests that the 
Polanyian approach has fewer handicaps as a model-building enterprise conducive to 
supporting research programs. As Gulick notes: 
a Polanyian biosemiotics avoids the tendency found in many episte-
mological schemes to atomize moments of knowing. The tendency 
toward epistemological atomism is exhibited to some degree in 
Whitehead’s great stress on a concrescing occasion or in Peirce’s 
emphasis on signs rather than bodies, communities, etc. If one over-
stresses the subsidiary-focal, tacit-explicit or from-to relations in 
Polanyi’s epistemology, one can be guilty of this sort of atomism…
The “from” dimension can be analyzed in terms of many levels. The 
biologist can unpack the physiological functions and anatomical 
structures that make cognition possible; the psychologist can speak 
of the roles of memory, desire, fear, and such factors in behavior; and 
the sociologist can root the “from” at a transpersonal level in social 
mores, status-seeking, ideological beliefs, and the like to make gener-
alizations about group behavior (Gulick 2012, 29).
It is important to note that the approaches of Polanyi and Hoffmeyer diverge on 
how they address the domain of the living, “the vastly extended scale of increasing 
complexity and enhanced ability to respond to their niches from single-celled bacteria 
to the mammals” (Gulick 2012, 22). 
Polanyi builds his multi-layered account from form, structure, and boundary 
conditions (Polanyi 1968; see also Margitay 2010 and 2012). For Polanyi, active 
centers play a key role in the identification of entities and levels of description, where 
it makes sense to talk about “originality as a performance, the procedure of which we 
cannot specify” (PK, 336). Polanyi builds on practices of inquiry, where individual-
ity is a “personal fact, and to that extent unspecifiable” (PK, 343). For Polanyi, the 
dynamo-physical world is the substrate of second order emergence, which produces 
self-centered functioning (Gulick 2012, 21) of life and living systems, and eventually, a 
third order of emergence which accounts for humans evolving from signal awareness to 
symbol-produced conception (for both Polanyi and Gulick).1 Studying a living thing, 
we learn about the second emergent level, and to study how a living thing studies a 
living thing clearly belongs to the third, reflexive level. 
Hoffmeyer’s biosemiotics focuses on meaning and semiosis and has to negotiate 
between a constrained thermodynamic system-framing organic evolution and a “spec-
trum of signs,” or messages, where “a principal and distinctive characteristic of semiotic 
biology lies in the understanding that in living, entities do not interact like mechani-
cal bodies, but rather as messages, the pieces of text” (Kull 1999, 385). By relying on 
34
some of the old obstacles of a text-based (Saussurian) representative culture in a semi-
Peircean packaging, the following question seems natural: can the primarily exegetical 
approach of Hoffmeyer provide a unifying account of life in its myriad shapes and 
forms and meanings? Does it provide an answer to the Big Question of life’s nature? 
The Hoffmeyerian strand of biosemiotics appears to claim the prize, but before 
we discuss some of the basic tenets offered by this “new synthesis,” we first investi-
gate the question from a historiographical perspective, as Hoffmeyer often portrays 
his enterprise as radically different from so-called traditional (“reductionistic”) biology. 
Hoffmeyer’s offer to replace the “old synthesis” comes with historical partisanship, and 
the often monumentally present precursors, commonly depicted in a markedly “whig” 
historical narrative suggests that the focus is more on attacking some metaphysical 
views, than offering a theoretically meaningful alternative synthetic theory. 
In the first part of this article, we give a historical review of Hoffmeyer’s narrative 
of the New Synthesis (Sections 2-4), then we will discuss some examples of entan-
gled ontological commitments as we investigate the coextension of life and semiosis 
(Section 5), the gradation of the Great Semiotic Chain (Section 6), and the analogy 
drawn between biosemiotics and the “punctuated equilibrium” model by Gould and 
Eldredge (Section 7). 
Precursors to Biosemiotics:  
Notes on Hoffmeyer’s Approach to the Past
Hoffmeyer claims that twentieth century biological sciences were dominated by 
two major trends. A negative trend is the “molecular and genetic” reductionism that 
tries to offer a quantitative analysis of various phenomena, whereas a less noticed but 
in his view positive trend is the “semiotization of nature.” The former is stigmatized 
as being dogmatic, because “semiotic creativity of biological systems at all levels of 
complexity is systematically excluded from the explanatory universe of the synthesis” 
(Hoffmeyer 1997a). The need to polarize the discussion and divide groups is a sign of 
dichotomization, where important aspects of contemporary debates can easily be lost. 
Otto Neurath, the Vienna Circle positivist, noted that “dichotomies…are not only 
crude intellectually, but also mostly the product of scientific pugnacity” (Neurath 1983, 
15), and the militant debate-seeking rhetoric might even be detrimental to knowledge-
production and can hardly be considered as beneficial epistemically. This reductionist 
or “extrapolationist” interpretation is quite common amongst the opponents of the 
Neo-Darwinian program (e.g., Gould & Lewontin 1979; Noble 2011 and 2015), but 
this popular depiction of the synthetic theory is strongly oversimplified (Somocovitis 
1996 and Lennox 2008).2 
For Hoffmeyer, the modern Neo-Darwinian theory of evolution was never a “real 
synthesis” (Hoffmeyer 1997a), because it was “lacking in the way that significantly 
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reflects remnants of ontological ideas that by and large are characteristic of twentieth-
century natural science” (Hoffmeyer 2008, 7). This reconstruction of the developments 
of twentieth century biology is characterized by the retrospective heraldization and 
deification of certain figures. With “whiggish” overtones, it offers a polemical attack on 
some straw-man “ultradarwinism” (Grene 1997). It is noteworthy how the supposedly 
cornered opponent is demonized in an elliptical and distorted narrative. 
In this historical sketch, the other modern trend is “less noticed but in the long 
run is just as important” (Hoffmeyer 1997a), namely, the semiotization of nature. 
Emmeche uses the term “spontaneous semiotics” (Emmeche 1999, 274) to describe 
these varied practices within modern biology. According to Hoffmeyer’s historical 
analysis, “the earliest manifestation of this trend [i.e., a proto-biosemiotic approach] 
is probably in the work of the German biologist Jakob von Uexküll, who in the first 
part of this century developed his Umweltsforschung” (Hoffmeyer 1997a), a “line of 
thought which is, at heart, semiotic, or biosemiotic, though he himself never used these 
terms” (Hoffmeyer 1997b, 56). Framing von Uexküll’s approach as proto-biosemiotic 
downplays the relevance of intellectual lineage connecting Johannes Müller’s specific 
sensory energies and the intense development in the physiology of perception. Von 
Uexküll’s work is generally connected to later developments in the narratives, like the 
phenomenological tradition (Harney 2015), and not to the rich soil of early twenti-
eth century scientific model-building conventions studying life and the living, which, 
among other achievements, gave birth to the New Synthesis. The historical lacunae 
(e.g., forgetting that one of the fathers of Neo-Darwinism, Sewall Wright, subscribed 
to some form of panpsychic organicism) helps Hoffmeyer to portray the biosemiotic 
enterprise as an underdog with integrative potential, as semioticizing approaches are 
“already tacitly permitted in the disciplines,” but “it simply remains to become devel-
oped as a new integrated paradigm” (Hoffmeyer 2008, 15). 
In Sebeok’s thesis, semiosis is what distinguishes all that is animate from what is 
life-less; it is “at the heart of life” (Sebeok 1991a, 85), is “the criterial attribute of life” 
(Sebeok 1991b, 124), and it presupposed life (Sebeok 2001 as cited in Hoffmeyer 
1997a). According to Hoffmeyer’s co-extension thesis, semiosis has been essential to 
life from the very beginning (Hoffmeyer & Stjernfelt, forthcoming, 3). It is an emer-
gent property, “appearing with the first life forms nearly 4 billion years ago,” leading 
to a modern unification of biology, based on the fundamentally semiotic nature of 
life (Hoffmeyer 1997a). This emergent process started with the very first life forms, 
reaching its provisional peak in the rich creativity of human thought and language 
(Hoffmeyer & Stjernfelt forthcoming, 21): “Cultural sign processes must be regarded 
as special instances of a more general and extensive biosemiosis” (Hoffmeyer 2008, 4) 
that is co-extensive with life itself (Kull et al. 2009, 168).3 
36
The Telic Aspect of Living
Although biosemiotics portrays itself as a biological enterprise, it is not the self-
autonomous, metabolizing life form, but the sign-process that is individuated, and 
this increases indeterminacy of description. Hoffmeyerian biosemiotics in principle 
assumes the usual, one-level structure of explanation. We think that it is here that 
Polanyi’s inquiry-based multi-layered account fares better than an approach utilizing a 
universal semiotic formula (agnostic with respect to the ontology of “habits”). Polanyi 
transposes a conceptual framework fit to study artistic creativity to animal and life-
form creativity (PK, 336), and builds his multi-layered ontological order from form, 
structure, and boundary conditions. 
It is instructive to investigate the different utilization of one of the common 
denominators in Polanyi’s and Hoffmeyer’s account, that of the neo-vitalist von 
Driesch. Polanyi was taking up a teleological point of view of life which he had first 
encountered in his studies of the vitalist von Driesch, who is also one of the favourite 
“early pioneers” of biosemiotics. One of the most disconcerting hiatuses in Hoffmeyer’s 
approach is the limited acknowledgement of the traditions leading up to von Driesch 
(Lenoir 1982). While Polanyi utilizes the neo-vitalist author together with Roux and 
Spemann (PK 355-357) to develop requirements for the telic interpretation of behav-
ior and his concept of equipotential systems, Hoffmeyer laments that “It was perhaps 
unfortunate that thermodynamics in Driesch’s time was not yet ready to function as 
the foundation for such a nonvitalistic solution,” and that the theory “became for 
many biologists the quintessential example of how badly it can go when philosophi-
cal considerations are given credence in connection with internal controversies in the 
biological disciplines” (Hoffmeyer 2008, 11). Nevertheless, his approach “in a radical 
sense transcends” some “molecular genetics,” more broadly some “hardcore reduction-
ism. . .all the way back to Descartes’s time” (ibid.).
Even Descartes clearly saw that a machine model cannot be the model of life, only 
a possible hypothesis concerning the functioning of a living being. Life, this hard-to-
eradicate fire in living things, is more mysterious. As he wrote in a letter to Regius,
A simple alteration is a process which does not change the form of a 
subject, such as the heating of wood; whereas generation is a process 
which changes the form, such as setting fire to the wood. Although 
both kinds of processes come about in the same way, there is a great 
difference in the way of conceiving them and also in reality. For 
forms, at least the more perfect ones, are collections of a number 
of qualities with a power of mutual preservation. In wood there is 
only moderate heat, to which it returns of its own accord after being 
heated; but in fire there is strong heat, which it always preserves as 
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long as it is fire (see Adam and Tanner 1996, 461; Cottingham, et al 
1991, 200-201; and Kékedi 2015, 145).
Biosemiotics claims that life is a “causally efficacious matrix of biological interac-
tion, the utterly natural product of organisms’ interaction” (Hoffmeyer 2008, 8). But 
this either boils down to reductionism, as in physical causation, or to incongruity, as 
in semiotic causation, some aspects of which will be discussed below. It anyway fails to 
give a “meaningful” boundary to the living form and the entity-level description. As 
opposed to materialistic accounts, it is information-driven and is located in a universe 
of theoretical kinds, downplaying the relevance of forms of life. 
Dreisch’s entelechy has a longer and more exciting history than Hoffmeyer’s simple 
polarization of opinions that non-experts in the history of biology might accept. The 
philosophical roots from Leibniz to Kant are just as relevant to this story as the histori-
cal empirical and experimental programs that relied upon the perceived inadequacies of 
mechanistic and reductive explanations. By the early 20th century, cytology in general 
has left behind the simplifying mechanistic cell concept (Hoppe 1997, 38). Driesch 
was connected to a major nineteenth century trend in conceiving of the biological, 
most clearly articulated in Kant, Blumenbach, and Goethe.4 But this teleomechanical 
strand also influenced Owen, Darwin, and evolutionary theory, just as it did anti-
Darwinists, such as D’Arcy W. Thompson in his “On Growth and Form,” leading up 
to Polanyi and beyond, even Gould in some of his many brilliant moods. The teleo-
mechanical tradition connected the study of form, function, telos, and the modelling 
practices with explanatory frameworks that had proved to be useful for the study of 
the non-living. It attempted to integrate the telic aspects of life with the mechanistic 
accounts of living functional forms. Although strongest in Germany, British natural 
history was also clearly informed about the stakes. 
Classification and Adaptation
Darwin, for example, was not trying to propose a theory which explained fully the 
nature of life (i.e., answer the Big Question), but was merely trying to find an entry 
point addressing, to a small extent, change in life forms. In support of the remark that 
he did not destroy teleology, but rather put it on a scientific footing, note what Darwin 
wrote to Asa Gray in 1874: “What you say about Teleology pleases me especially and I 
do not think anyone else has ever noted that” (quoted in Gotthelf 1999, 23). Natural 
selection since then became accepted to be a part of the Big Answer, but Darwinism 
never tried to extend it to look like the Big Answer. Neither did von Uexküll or von 
Driesch. That is, adaptive explanations are teleological, but teleological explanations 
are not only adaptive. Polanyi’s inquiry-approach in principle allows for many answers 
to gradually and partially map domains of creativity, including Life. Polanyi is a thinker 
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like others who distinguishes between a) the realm of physics and chemistry, b) the 
emergent realm of living things, and c) the emergence of humanity. “While the first 
rise of living individuals overcame the meaninglessness of the universe by establishing 
in it centres of subjective interests, the rise of human thought in its turn overcame these 
subjective interests by its universal intent” (PK, 389).
Biosemiotics, in contrast, seems to opt for some vaguely explicated co-extensiv-
ity-thesis, and every theoretician who carved out more carefully the territory of the 
explanandum becomes a proto-theoretician, a precursor. Militant Darwinists, in the last 
epoch most notoriously Dawkins, sometimes are guilty of asserting some form of the 
co-extensivity-thesis by trying to eliminate teleology, and Hoffmeyerian biosemiotics 
in its focus on signs comes dangerously close to doing this as well, supposing that life 
can be a product of interactions and sign processes. 
At stake is our insight into the Big Question: how can a framework grasp Life? 
With Linnaeus, hierarchical sets entered the Garden of Eden, and a grip was found 
on ever-changing Life. As the saying went: “Deus creavit, Linnaeus disposuit:” God 
created, the “Second Adam,” Linnaeus, organized (Lindroth 1994, 22). This attempt 
at classification was nothing new to the biological tradition that has for millenia been 
struggling with ever-changing Life. Hierarchical classification does not have much 
in common with Life, and putting items in boxes or tying them to things can only 
partially constrain the Living. Darwin focused on one of the most established and 
seemingly stable aspects of the living, the categorizability of the morphing/morphed 
forms into genera and species. His theory targeted the “existence of stable, autono-
mous, and self-reproducing entities” (Keller 2009, 8). The target idea of stable species 
was duly destroyed, as from the strict ranked hierarchy of family, order, class—in other 
terms, classification—evolved the age of redefinable “clades,” the groups of organisms 
classified together on the basis of evolution from a common ancestor.
In a footnote added to “An Historical Sketch,” appended to later editions of The 
Origin of Species, Darwin acknowledged his debt to Goethe, who was named a worthy 
forerunner, an “extreme partisan” with his morphology, an approach to studying living 
forms and their formation. Goethe was eager to follow up on the Big Question, and he 
started a dialogue with the mystery that stands in the way of systematization: “Natural 
system—a contradiction in terms. Nature has no system; she has, she is life and its 
progress from an unknown centre toward an unknowable goal. Scientific research is 
therefore endless” (quoted in Müller 1989, 116). Goethe cautioned the practitioner in 
his article, “Problem”:
The concept of metamorphosis is a highly estimable gift from above, 
but at the same time a highly dangerous one…It leads to formlessness, 
destroys knowledge, disintegrates it. It is like centrifugal force and 
would lose itself in the infinite if a counterweight were not provided. 
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I am referring to the specification force [Spezifikationstrieb], that 
tenacious capacity for persistence inherent in whatever has attained 
existence, a centripetal force (Müller 1989, 116).
Darwinian evolution grew on the rich soil of this morphological tradition, where 
plasticity always had to be allowed for to account for evolvability. The journal Nature 
started its first issue (4 November 1869) with Goethe’s orphic aphorisms on nature, the 
influence of which Thomas Henry Huxley took care to admit. In this tradition, failures 
and irregularities with respect to our norms and standards, informative “exemplars” 
were considered epistemically valuable, in fact superior to the examples of the regular, 
the schematic, the propositional textbook-knowledge that helps one to interactional, 
but not contributory expertise. 
One of the strange exemplars of Goethe’s morphology is the perfoliate rose, a devi-
ant form, which nevertheless testifies to some lawfulness, and helps a “higher order” 
understanding of organization. The entelechy can only be pursued and not grasped, and 
the search for the lawful has to be alert to the seemingly unlawful, but in Hoffmeyer’s 
biosemiotics there is little space carved out for “error-handling,” ways of making use 
of going amiss. Let us not forget that Polanyi is extensively using this technique of so 
many progressive research programs (including Darwin’s), utilizing deviations and tera-
tology in his account, from Lashley’s mutilated rats to the crippled Renoir to establish 
the domains of emergence (PK, 337).
Since Polanyi’s time, modelling relations and explanatory structures have received 
much attention, and the issue of emergence has become a hot topic in the contempo-
rary philosophy of mind and philosophy of science (e.g. Butterfield 2011, Crane 2001, 
Cunningham 2001, Harré 2006, Kistler 2006). There are several different concepts of 
emergence (for possible taxonomies see Bedau 1997 and 2010, along with Chalmers 
2008), but Hoffmeyer’s notions of emergence and emergent properties are very unsub-
stantiated and vague. His unusual and little-developed emergentism suggests that 
living systems should be studied as semiotic systems on their own right (Hoffmeyer 
2010, 189). The vague ontology includes only a thermodynamic constraint, ignoring 
the venerable tradition that, to account for life, one needs to account for the organism’s 
self-drive to live, not just the chemistry of the inner machinery, population genetics, 
evolutionary history, and semiotic relationships. 
It is claimed that semiosis is an emergent property in our universe appearing with 
the first life forms nearly 4 billion years ago (Hoffmeyer 1997), but we take this more as 
an underspecified claim of co-extension than a bold and original assumption. To locate 
the spatial coordinates of the first semiotic system, we run into difficulties, as semiosis 
transcends the boundaries of the living form to include aspects of the environment, and 
temporal delineation has congruency-problems. 
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Life, Semiosis, Coextension
For Hoffmeyer, the terms semiotic freedom, semiosphere, and semiotic niche 
represent real features of the world. Semiotic evolution through the history of life 
enhances semiotic freedom, the increasing complexity and sophistication of types of 
semiotic causality and infl uence within individuals and between species. The growth of 
semiotic freedom has a far-reaching historical dimension:
The historical nature of the world has profound consequences for the 
study of life, because it confronts us with the problem of organiza-
tion in a new way. If the complex forms of organization exhibited by 
living systems—from the cell to the ecosystem—are not the inescap-
able result of predictable lawfulness, they must instead have emerged 
through processes that are still in need of discovery (Hoffmeyer 
2010, 191-192).
The degree of semiotic complexity increases from the fi rst steps of molecular 
recognition to the highest-level forms of semiosis. This affects “the depth of mean-
ing that an individual or species is capable of communicating” (Hoffmeyer 2008, 
186). However, the growth of semiotic freedom brings increasing indeterminacy in 
Hoffmeyer’s biosemiotic account—or rather his account of accounts, a theory-driven 
aggregate of explanations, with little consideration for individual, deviant forms. For 
example, the perfoliate rose (Image 1), an example of irregular metamorphosis once 
seen by Goethe, must have had a semiotic niche in the semiosphere, its organism-
centered Umwelt. It must also have become part of our 
semiotic niche, thanks to our increased intellectual semi-
otic freedom and the notion of co-extensivity. This long 
gone organism was once part of the semiosphere, and, 
although no longer living, retains a ghost-like existence in 
the semiosphere. Is the semiosphere therefore an abstract 
collection of past and present forms and perhaps future 
possibilities? 
The semiosphere emerged when meaning or signifi -
cance in the realm of matter and energy was born in itself 
and by itself. The semiosphere, created by biosemiosis, is 
likened to some natural phenomena; it is “a sphere just 
like the atmosphere, the hydrosphere, and the biosphere.” 
It confronts life in a continuously unfolding present, as it 
“penetrates to every corner of these other spheres, incor-
porating all forms of communication: sounds, smells, 
movements, colors, shapes, electrical fi elds, thermal 
Image 1: The perfoliate 
Rose (Hans Wahl, Anton 
Kippenberg: Goethe und 
seine Welt, Insel-Verlag, 
Leipzig 1932 S.143)
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radiation, waves of all kinds, chemical signals, touching, and so on. In short, signs of 
life” (Hoffmeyer 1997b, vii). 
And, to make a radical enough alternative to reductionism, biosemiotics also 
incorporates elements from the future. “Peirce was of the opinion that it is untenable 
doctrine to say that the future does not influence the present” (Deely 2015, 355). With 
the increase of semiotic freedom in the semiosphere, anticipatory functions model the 
possible future of the organism in acts of semiosis, thus freedom incorporates more and 
more of the temporal dimension into the organism.5 But couldn’t future development 
be non-semiotically produced or controlled by past habits? The present moment of the 
biosphere is just as it is, while the present moment of co-occurring biosemiotic spheres 
is entangled with the future, and, as it is also an evolutionary theory, it encompasses the 
past. Control develops as anticipation improves, thus with growth of freedom in the 
semiosphere, in contrast to deterministic constraint, comes increasing indeterminacy 
and entanglement of matter with time, as it will have more and more closed loops of 
entailment (models of anticipatory systems, Rosen 1999, 95). Much of modern theo-
rizing in biology is strongly connected with rejecting the co-extensivity assumption. 
The self-sustaining living thing is a non-transparently functioning but teleologi-
cal system, historically shaped by elements of its surroundings, a compound corporeal 
system. Its development is somehow closely connected to coming to grips with its 
preformed and evolved mereology. This thing that is alive is also informed by countless 
earlier living forms constituting its ancestry, and, higher up the biosemiotic ladder of 
freedom, it anticipates more and more of the future, and starts to transform it, as it is in 
constant fusion with its environment. Such a multi-faceted account of the organismic 
cannot be limited to just the biosemiotic facet of the teleologically informed aspects of 
the mystery.
The Great Chain of Semiosis
In a forthcoming article, Hoffmeyer and Stjernfelt claim there is a progressive 
trend in the history of life, the Great Chain of Biosemiosis, where the progression in 
semiotic freedom gives rise to discrete steps or levels, into a “scaling [which] immedi-
ately catches the eye” (1). Let us see how they understand the biosemiotic framework 
to separate these discrete steps (indicated by capital letters). 
A rather primitive form of semiosis is the Division of Labor in Multicellular 
Organism (Endosemiosis), a crucial evolutionary step from uni- to multicellular 
organism involving “the differentiation between different, collaborating cell types and 
hence the semiotic coordination of different behaviors of those cells” (8). Occupying a 
slightly higher position at the semiotic scale is From Irritability to Phenotypic Plasticity 
in Plants, a system’s physiological response to a stimulus. “‘Irritability’ is semiotically 
more developed than ‘molecular recognition’ since it occurs at the level of the organ 
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or whole organism and typically implies the simultaneous activation of several parallel 
and/or consecutive recognition processes” (8).
Description of the lower level utilizes a behavioristic account, while a “slightly” 
more advanced level already talks of recognition, and even proto-cognitive capacities 
with respect to the phenotypic plasticity of plants.
Here, a primitive division of labor anticipates the distinction between 
germ cells and soma cells, as the lower cells in the stalk so to speak 
sacrifice themselves for the survival of the group. Such large-scale 
coordination between cells presupposes the recognition of conspe-
cifics and a sophisticated chemical-espatial communication between 
them (8).
Discrete levels of biosemiosis seem questionable as is the assumed discreteness of 
the entity that we characterize in an act of biosemiosis. First, consider the redwood 
forest, Sequoia sempervirens, where each tree responds physiologically via sophisti-
cated machinery, adapting to the ever-changing environment. Now, consider the same 
forest as a clonal entity, as some are, where the forest is a single organism (gamet) and 
“response” includes the demise of some gamets, along with the generation of some new 
shoots. At least some research suggests that the extent of clones and their spatial struc-
ture may have important evolutionary implications (Douhovnikoff & Dodd 2004). As 
most plants with plasma-bridges connecting their intercellular matrices cannot really 
be called bounded on the cellular level, the forest has, at the same time, the semiotic 
capabilities of only a unicellular organism, and at least the proto-cognitive capability 
of a plant. And isn’t then the redwood tree in a similar state of self-organizing chaos 
as social insects, exhibiting a form of swarm intelligence (Hoffmeyer 1997b, 113)? As 
a myriad of ants build an ant-hill, a divided cell builds a myriad of trees, the clonal 
redwood-forest. Can different types of semiosis operate simultaneously on one level, 
and the same type on different ones (cell, tree, forest)?
Thanks to the epigenetic wisdom of plants, seeds of the same species grown on 
different soils produce seeds that reflect the challenges posed by the particularities of the 
environment. Higher up on the Great Biosemiotic Chain, just as the peak of Sentience 
is reached, the Learning and Social Intelligence attributable to fish would also seem-
ingly be characteristic of self-fertilizing plants. “If learning is something like a capacity 
for modifying one’s responsive predispositions and [aligning] them to the challenges posed by 
the particularities of one’s environment, . . .then advanced learning skills have been a part 
of life on Earth for more than 400 million years” (15). 
When we look at the amorphously bounded and permeable steps that stand for the 
structure of the theoretical Great Chain of Semiosis, we see how difficulties are encoun-
tered once organizational constraints get fused with the “sphere of sign processes and 
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elements of meaning that constitute a frame of understanding within which biology 
must work” (Hoffmeyer 2008, 5). 
Punctuated Semiotic Evolution
The vague positioning of the enterprise with respect to delineability and discrete-
ness of individuals and types also affects the “structure-thesis” of biosemiotics, a 
recurring portrayal in terms of current evolutionary theory that is connected to Stephen 
Jay Gould and Niles Eldredge, and their famous punctuated equilibrium model. Gould 
and Eldredge introduced their model as a consequence of apparent bursts of speciation 
after mass extinctions, i.e., the emergence of new species challenging the traditional 
thinking about the tempo and mode of evolutionary change (Eldredge & Gould 1972, 
Gould & Eldredge 1977). While speciation and the process of evolution according 
to Darwin involves slow, gradualistic change, Gould and Eldredge state that most 
evolutionary changes happen—geologically speaking—very quickly during speciation 
events. How does biosemiotics relate to the issue of rapid versus gradual evolutionary 
change? Biosemiotic thought appears to be modeled on punctuated equilibrium as 
understood by Gould and Eldridge: “If we accept punctuated equilibrium as a basic 
structure in biological evolution, we should expect the semiotic evolution to follow the 
same structure, hence displaying a ladder of increasingly complex sign types” (Stjernfelt 
2002, 338). 
Biological evolution and semiotic evolution, as co-extensive, conditionally instan-
tiate isomorphic structures.6 Hoffmeyer holds that semiotic evolution can in principle 
provide an explanation of sympatric species generation (that is, separate species devel-
oping from a common ancestor in the same geographical area).
Recognition not only of mates, but also of a multitude of other cues 
in the environment, might influence the reproductive pattern in such 
a way as to create isolation. Thus sympatric speciation—which for 
many reasons seems to be the more attractive model, if only one 
could find a plausible mechanism—might be obtained by a number 
of purely semiotic barriers. So semiotics might even hold the clue 
to this most central of Darwinian events: the origin of new species 
(Hoffmeyer 1997b). 
While speciation and the process of evolution, according to Darwin, happens 
gradually within the species’ geographical range, Gould and Eldredge claim that much 
of the phenotypic change is quick during allopatric (geographically separate) speciation 
events. The theorists of punctuated equilibrium see allopatric speciation as the domi-
nant form of speciation, while sympatric speciation is mostly viewed as irrelevant to 
our understanding of large-scale evolutionary patterns. However, it seems odd that in 
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the case of the Hoffmeyerian version of biosemiotics, which on the basis of co-exten-
sion should parallel punctuated equilibrium theory, it is sympatric speciation that is 
stressed, as it can warrant semiotic freedom.
Biosemiotics reaches for a non-gradualist narrative of organic evolution without 
clearly explicating the structure or the landscape of the “Great Chain;” they merely 
point to the Semiosphere: 
In this sphere the dynamics of history (evolution) changed and began 
to become individualised, so that each little section of history became 
unique and henceforward no big formulas could be erected covering 
the whole process…if quantification is wanted, it should be searched 
not at the level of genetics, but at the level of the constrained ther-
modynamic system framing organic evolution (Hoffmeyer, 1997a).
This in our view comes close to forgetting the actual developing shape of a particu-
lar living being when trying to account for biological processes. Hoffmeyer holds that 
“the most pronounced feature of organic evolution was…not the creation of a multi-
plicity of amazing morphological structures, but the general expansion of “semiotic 
freedom’” (Hoffmeyer 2008, 188).7
Hoffmeyer is more of a selectionist than Gould and Eldredge, whose theory 
assumes that something other is more formative in speciation than semiosis, “sign 
action, i.e., a process whereby a sign induces a receptive system to make an inter-
pretation” (Hoffmeyer & Stjernfelt, forthcoming, 2). When we look for the implied 
structure of the approach of biosemiotics, just as in the steps in evolution, we see that 
only a loose mapping is offered, as the recent programmatic article talks of chains, 
scales, and a “provisional peak in the rich combination possibilities of human thought 
and language” (Hoffmeyer & Stjernfelt forthcoming, 22). The result is a framework 
where seemingly increasing levels of complexity are ascribed stages in the growth of 
biosemiotic freedom, yet the levels get entangled and cannot be clearly distinguished.
Biosemiotics can only partially illuminate life, as functional sign-relations cannot 
constitute entities, nor can they delineate meaningful levels of organismic complex-
ity. As the sign processes are quantitized, the implications of this co-extensivity thesis 
assuming the same spatial or temporal scope of biosemiosis and life appears odd as no 
semiotic map of any phenomenal domain is coextensive with its territory, having the 
same spatial or temporal scope with what it is the mapping of.8
Some popular accounts of current biosemiotics focus so much on meaning and 
semiosis that non-functional signs of life become “dead weight,” best discarded, left 
behind. In an illuminating example, Hoffmeyer states that a “moth’s sonic universe…
can pick up only one particular note…emitted…by a bat. This note enables the moth 
to determine how far off its enemy may be and in what direction” (Hoffmeyer 1997b, 
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53). The moth’s sonic universe has functional, semiotic meaning. The functional vibra-
tions from the bat enter the moth’s semiotic universe, the noise that humans hear as 
the moth flies by does not. It has been discovered that some moths rub their genitals to 
jam bat echolocation and startle or deceive bats (Barber & Kawahara 2013), but only 
once the discovery is made, does the moth’s own sound enter the semiotic universe. 
Non-functional forms and signs of life are mostly up for grabs in the semiotic tradition, 
where meanings are first and foremost ascribed to readable or decodable signs, but not 
to the puzzling and mysterious forms, shapes, and morphings of Life. 
Concluding Remarks
We started out with a comparison between Polanyi’s multi-layered ontology 
and Hoffmeyer’s biosemiotic enterprise. We highlighted some of the benefits of the 
former while pointing to deficits of Hoffmeyer’s overtly polarized, whiggish narra-
tive, according to which, there are “two major trends in twentieth century biology.” 
One is the molecular and genetic reductionism (basically interpreted as the modern 
Neo-Darwinian synthesis) and other is the so-called semiotization of nature. Polemic 
narrative-constructions re-appearing in various loci of this strand of the biosemiotic 
corpus were suggested to obscure the systematic theory-construction required for a 
comprehensive, synthetic theory. The lacunae mask the continuity of the inventive 
struggle to incorporate the teleology of living things in our understanding of nature 
from Aristotle to Schrödinger, and stand in the way of integrating the modern biose-
miotic tradition (providing many key insights) within the broader history of biological 
theorizing. 
We investigated some elements of this innovative approach to trace how forms of 
life are handled by Hoffmeyerian biosemiotics. Hoffmeyer offers some basic notions to 
analyze this question: semiotic freedom, semiotic niche, semiosphere and the co-exten-
sivity thesis. Semiosis is called an emergent trait, co-extensive with life, thus appearing 
with the first life forms. This co-extension gave rise to the semiosphere, incorporating 
every sign of life and aspects of the past, the present, and the future. According to 
Hoffmeyer, the degree of semiotic complexity in the semiosphere increases from the 
very beginning of life on Earth. But the conflation of temporal and spatial features of 
semiotic systems is problematic and possibly implies incongruent metaphysical views. 
Hoffmeyer’s emergentism is another source of entangled ontological commit-
ments. The progressive trend in evolution constitutes the Great Chain of Semiosis, 
but the approach maneuvers between meaningfully discrete layers or levels, on the one 
hand, and a loose gradualist mapping conforming to some unspecified topography of 
the domain, on the other hand. We argued that it is not clear what the relationship is 
between this pattern of increasing semiotic freedom in the course of life and the model 
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of punctuated equilibrium. What is the exact structure of this non-gradualist narrative? 
Does it really have one?
Endnotes
1“There are then two principles at work in animals: namely, (1) the use of machine-like contriv-
ances and (2) the inventive powers of animal life” (PK, 337).
2Hoffmeyer’s concept of reduction and reductionism is not informed by recent debates 
surrounding the philosophy of biology (Rosenberg 2006, Brigandt & Love 2015). In the citation 
above from Hoffmeyer 1997a, he uses “molecular” and “genetic.” If “genetic” is understood as molec-
ular, it is superfluous, and if “genertic” is understood as evolutionary, the statement is false. For a 
more informed historical overview, see Müller-Wille and Rheinberger (2009) for the philosophical 
stakes, Kitcher (1984) Morrison (2000).
3Making no clear distinctions between the “phases” of the semiosphere allows the enterprise 
to remain mostly non-reflexive, thus questionably able to account for metacognition and “second-
order-survival” (Oeser 1997, 87).
4This connection is acknowledged in some historical accounts, see Fernandez (forthcoming). 
5For these reasons of dubious temporality, we do not clearly understand how the semiotic niche 
concept is analogous to the ecological one. In order to occupy a semiotic niche, an organism or 
species “has to master a set of signs of a visual, acoustic, olfactory, tactile, and chemical nature, by 
means of which it can control its survival in the semiosphere” (Hoffmeyer 2008, 185). Expansion 
of semiotic freedom involves the union of all semiotic niches, each definable in an n-dimensional 
hypervolume. 
6See the difference between similarity and isomorphy in Suarez (2010)
7“The semiotic ordering (through spans of evolutionary history) of chemistry holds the key to 
the function of this chemistry. In this sense, and only in this sense, is life an irreducible phenomenon” 
(Hoffmeyer, 1997a). A living organism is both a unity in multiplicity, and a multiplicity in unity, 
posing a mereological problem that cannot be solved via thermodynamics only (Bortoft 1996, 343).
8Causal complexity generally requires reconstitution of phenomena (Kronfeldner 2015), but 
biosemiotics tends to present the partial structure as the whole picture. 
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